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LEGALISATION OF VOLUNTARY 
EUTHANASIA 
Graham Oddie' 
If a person is suffering from some illness or disability and wishes to end their We the law 
ought to facilitate rather than frustrate that choice argues Graham Oddie in this article. He 
points out the inconsistencies in current medical practice, and the gross disparity between the 
practice and the letter of the law. In dismissing many of the commonly raised objections to calls 
for reform of the law permitting euthanasia he makes a strong case for consistency in our 
approach to the right to die and patient autonomy. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the light of the rise and fall of the law permitting a form of euthanasia in the Northern 
Territories, the leaders of the main political parties called for a public debate on the issue of 
the moral and legal permissibility of euthanasia in New Zealand. Surprisingly. almost 
everybody-including the clergy, physicians. politicians, ethicists and almost anybody who 
gives it any sustained thought-already endorses the moral permissibility of euthanasia. 
However this endorsement is usually highly partial. Certain rather subtle kinds of 
euthanasia are deemed to be morally permissible, whereas other more obvious kinds are 
deemed to be cases of murder. The debate is thus not really about whether euthanasia is 
morally permissible, and hence whether it should be legalised at all, but rather which kinds 
of euthanasia are morally permissible, and how the practice of euthanasia should be legally 
regulated. 
The distinction which undergirds this partial endorsement of euthanasia is that between 
killing and letting-die. Intentionally taking active steps to terminate the life of a person is 
thought to be always and everywhere seriously wrong. By contrast, failing to take steps to 
prevent a person from dying when it would be possible to do so is thought to be, at least on 
some occasions, morally permissible. Many think that killing an innocent person is such a 
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serious moral wrong that it should always be illegal-regardless of factors such as degree 
of suffering, the desire to be killed, or the giving of informed consent to be killed. But many of 
the same people who take this view nevertheless think that it can also be morally 
permissible to fail to take "extraordinary measures" to prevent a death, and further that it 
should not always be illegal to withhold life-saving treatment. Active euthanasia (killing) is 
always morally wrong, and should be legally forbidden. Passive euthanasia (merely letting-
die) may be morally permissible, even morally praiseworthy, and there should be provision 
in the law for legitimate application of it. 
I will argue that there is a deep incoherence in this asymmetric treatment of euthanasia. 
The asymmetry is rampant in common-sense morality, but also in medical thinking and 
medical practice. There are two ways of eliminating the asymmetry, of treating active and 
passive euthanasia on a par. One would be to deem all forms of euthanasia, both active and 
passive, equally impermissible, both morally and legally. The other would be to endorse the 
permissibility of active euthanasia in cases which are in all other respects just like 
permissible cases of passive euthanasia. The former would lead to unacceptable, indeed 
bizarre, results. 
II KILLING AND LETTING DIE: A BARE-DIFFERENCE ARGUMENT 
A What is a bare-difference argument? 
In trying to determine whether the presence or absence of a certain feature is good or bad 
in itself the method of bare differences is often employed. The idea is really rather simple. If a 
feature really is a bad one, then wherever it occurs it must make some difference for the 
worse. Thus, supposing the feature to be bad, if two possible situations differ solely in the 
presence/ absence of that feature then the situation in which it is present should be worse, 
overall, than the situation in which the feature is absent. The two situations are barely 
different because they differ only over the feature in question- everything else is held fixed. 
Now if we can find two such barely different situations which do not differ in overall 
value, then the feature over which they differ cannot be morally relevant. 
Suppose we have a pair of situations, A and B, which differ only in one respect-A has 
feature P and B lacks it. If P were an intrinsically bad feature then A would have to be 
worse than B. So if, intuitively, there is absolutely no moral difference between A and B, 
then P cannot be bad in itself. Call this the bare-difference principle. Note that, given this 
principle, if you want to refute the claim that P is an intrinsically morally bad feature, you 
need to find a pair of possible situations which differ only over the presence of P, but which 
do not differ in value, or differ in any morally interesting way. 
A scientific analogy might help here. How does one determine whether a factor (like the 
presence of oxygen) is causally relevant to some process (like burning)? One devises an 
experiment in which the only difference is the presence/absence of oxygen. If a candle in a 
THE MORAL CASE FOR THE LEGALISATION OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 
jar with oxygen will burn, but an otherwise similar candle in a jar without oxygen will not 
burn, then we know that the presence of oxygen has something to do with burning: it is 
causally relevant to burning. However if we shine a blue light on the one candle and a red 
light on an otherwise exactly similar candle, and both burn, then that seems enough to refute 
the claim that the colour of light shining on the candle is relevant to burning. This is a bare 
difference argument in the realm of causal relevance. Bare difference arguments in the realm 
of moral relevance work in an analogous way. 
Consider the example of a bare difference argument. A patient, suffering in the advanced 
stages of terminal cancer, is given morphine in increasingly high doses to control the pain. 
What should happen if, accidentally, the morphine suppresses the respiratory system and 
the patient stops breathing? There will often be an instruction in place, or an informal 
understanding amongst the patient's care-givers, not to use any "extraordinary measures" 
to resuscitate him or her. The rationale for this is clear. If the patient were to stop breathing 
death, even though entirely preventable, would be a blessing. It is thus considered morally 
permissible to allow the patient to die, for the reason that death would be better for him or 
her than continuing to live. Letting people die because their lives are an unnecessary burden 
to them is passive euthanasia. Few argue against passive euthanasia in such cases. Is there 
anybody who thinks that every technical means available should be employed to stop 
people dying whenever they could be dragged back from death? We all recognise that would 
often be both stupid and cruel. However, many who endorse passive euthanasia, hold it to 
be grossly immoral to administer morphine, to the terminally ill patient in the above case, in 
doses which would bring about the very same effect, in the very same way, for the very same 
reason it is welcomed in the case of passive euthanasia-namely, that death would be a 
blessing. How can the very same outcome, so welcome in the one case be so abhorrent in the 
other? What makes the difference? 
The answer can only be that killing someone, taking deliberate steps to bring about the 
end of a life, is always and everywhere a terribly bad thing, something which, in itself, is 
worse, much worse, than merely letting someone die. This is what the debate about the moral 
permissibility of euthanasia boils down to. It is not whether euthanasia is morally 
permissible, but whether active euthanasia (killing) is as morally permissible as passive 
euthanasia (letting-die ). 
B Bare difference and the killing/letting-die distinction 
Suppose a person with a severe condition, painful as well as totally disabling, without 
any prospect of improvement, has repeatedly asked for his or her life-support machine to be 
turned off- something he or she cannot manage for themself. With the machine on, his or her 
body will continue to function in its present state indefinitely. So to deliberately turn off the 
machine in order to end the patient's life would be to kill him or her. 
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Now imagine two different scenarios: 
Case 1 The physician listens to the patient's arguments, agrees with the their assessment of 
their condition, feels the patient has very good reasons for preferring death to life that cannot 
be disputed, and consults with the patient's loved ones who are all in agreement. The 
physician then turns the machine off and hangs about to make sure no one else comes in and 
turns it on again, until sure the patient is dead. This seems to be a clear case of killing the 
patient. 
Case 2 the physician feels the very same way but cannot bring him or herself to kill the 
patient. While she arguing with the patient about this a cleaner comes in and accidentally and 
unwittingly pulls the plug out, plugs in the vacuum cleaner, and merrily starts vacuuming. At 
first the physician is horrified. But then it dawns on him or her that if she or he does nothing 
she or he cam10t be justifiably accused of killing the patient. By doing nothing, the doctor will 
merely have allowed the patient to die. Doing nothing to stop the patient dying will be a case 
of passive euthanasia, something which the doctor and her colleagues practice every other 
day - whenever treatment is withheld because it would merely prolong an agonising 
existence. 
In case 1 the physician kills the patient. In case 2, the physician merely allows him to die. 
There is definitely a difference between the two cases - killing and letting die are different -
and yet there appears to be no significant moral difference between them. The physician who 
allows the patient to die certainly seems no better than the physician who kills him. 
It follows from this simple thought experiment that in itself it is not worse to kill than to 
allow to die. For if it were then in comparing two cases that differ only in that one is a 
killing and the other an letting-die, we would feel compelled to judge that the killing is 
morally worse- and we don't.' 
C The role of intentionality 
It is important to see that the distinction between killing and letting-die has little to do 
with intentionality, or mens rea. It is not the case that the one who kills has ipso facto a 
different sort of intention from the one who allows to die. Killings may be either intentional 
or unintentional. In case 1 the doctor intentionally kills the patient, whereas in case 2 the 
j Rachels was the first to present an argument of this form in the euthanasia debate in his article 
which originally appeared as the .. Active and Passive Euthanasia'' (1975) 292 New England Journal 
oj Medicine 78 reprinted in J M Fisher and M Ravizza, (eds) Ethics: Problems and Principles (New 
York, Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1992) 106. In his book The End oj Life (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1986) Rachels elaborates the argument and dubs the technique that of "bare-difference". 
The technique is actually an ancient one. For a quite different application see G Oddie, 
"Addiction and the Value of Freedom" (1993) 7(5) Bioethics 373-401. 
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cleaner unintentionally kills the patient. In case 2 the doctor intentionally lets the patient 
die. We can also imagine cases of an unintentionalletting-die.2 
Let us concentrate on intentional killing and intentional letting-die which are the salient 
categories in this context. In intentionally killing, one intends to do something in order to 
bring about a death which would not otherwise occur. One intends that a death come about 
through one's intervention into a process. However, in the case of intentional letting die one 
also intends that a death come about, this time through lack of intervention which would 
prevent it. In case 1 the doctor intentionally kills the patient. In case 2 the doctor 
intentionally lets the patient die. To intentionally let something happen you have to be able 
to prevent it, know you can prevent it, and intentionally fail to prevent it. In both cases, 
intentionally killing and intentionally letting-die, the intention is that a death come about, 
either through intervention or lack of intervention. What is crucial to the distinction is the 
role one plays in the causal ancestry of the death, not in one's intention that a death come 
about. Euthanasia, whether active or passive, is intentional. Active euthanasia is an 
intentional act; passive euthanasia is an intentional omission. The intended upshot is the 
same: that a death, which need not occur at that time, actually occur at that time. 
It does not follow from this that intentionally killing someone is not typically a bad 
thing. Nor does it follow that killing is not typically worse than letting die. A typical killing 
has lots of horrible features which a typical letting-die lacks - malicious intent, unnecessary 
suffering, acting without the killee's informed consent, violation of certain special rights, 
and so forth. But it is these concomitant horrible features which make the typical killing 
worse than a typical letting-die. And it is precisely in those situations in which the badness 
of killing humans is controversial- in the case of the terminally or congenitally ill, say- that 
these other horrible features may well be absent from a killing and present in an letting die. 
The point of the kind of "bare-difference" argument I have elaborated is to force us to 
abstract from the typical concomitants of killing or of letting-die and focus on the difference 
which killing and letting-die themselves sustain. What does this difference contribute to the 
morality of the situation? And the answer appears to be: none. 
D The Doctrine of Double Effect 
A related, but complicating, issue is the notorious doctrine of double effect. This doctrine 
is also grounded in supposed differences in intentionality. According to the doctrine it is 
permissible to do something which produces a very bad outcome so long as it is the 
Suppose there is an automatic fuse-switch on the plug of the life-support machine. When the 
cleaner turns on the vacuum cleaner the circuit is overloaded and the life-support plug 
automatically fuses. The cleaner notices this but can't be bothered resetting it because it would 
involve walking all the way across the room. By failing to reset the plug the cleaner 
unintentionally allows the patient to die. 
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unintended although foreseen side-effect of pursuing a very good end. However it is wrong 
to use the bad outcome as the intended means to pursuing the good outcome, even if the 
goodness of the good end outweighs the badness of the bad means. 
Consider the case we started with- the terminally ill patient who requires large doses 
of morphine to control the pain. There can be a fine line between the amount of morphine 
required to keep the patient comfortable, and the amount that would suppress his or her 
respiratory system. The doctor is entitled to administer large doses of morphine in order to 
control the patient's pain, even if that might have the unintended side-effect of stopping the 
patient's breathing and causing death. However, the doctor is not entitled to administer the 
very same large doses of morphine in order to increase the probability of suppressing the 
respiratory system. Palliative care which produces the unintended side-effect that a person 
dies before they would otherwise have died is permissible. But an intentional use of the very 
same procedures to shorten a life by the very same amount is not permissible. 
The doctrine does have at least one virtue: it provides a moral and legal shelter for what 
is effectively active euthanasia, and those who find it difficult to face up to the fact that 
what they are doing is shortening lives can take refuge in that shelter. But the doctrine is a 
notoriously difficult one to sustain rationally. Consider an extreme case. Suppose any dose 
capable of killing the patient's pain would also certainly kill the patient. Can anyone with 
full knowledge of this situation really administer the required dose intending only to kill the 
pain, but not to kill the patient? And even if it were possible could anything of deep moral 
significance tum on such refined mental gymnastics? Should the possession of such an 
ability make the difference between social disgrace and a hefty prison term on the one hand, 
and respectability and freedom on the other? 
E The Soundness of Bare-Difference Arguments 
Some philosophers have tried to undermine bare-difference arguments.3 But their 
arguments do not impugn the limited purpose to which I put this style of argument here. There 
are really only two possible escape routes for those who reject the conclusion that killing is 
no worse, in itself, than letting-die. 
The first is to deny the intuitive judgement on cases 1 and 2, and to simply to insist that 
there really is a big difference in value between then, and further that the case of killing is 
much worse than the case of letting-die. But this would be to allow one's theoretical 
commitments to override what I have usually found to be quite clear and decisive intuitive 
judgments people make about these two cases. Such theoretical overriding of clear-cut moral 
See S Kagan "The Additive Fallacy" reprinted in Fisher and Ravizza, above n 1, 252-271. For a 
reply see H Maim "In Defense of the Contrast Strategy" in Fisher and Ravizza, above n 1, 272-277. 
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intuitions would, if practised generally, make any criticism of high-level moral theories 
well-nigh impossible. 
The second is to deny the bare-difference principle that if Pis, say, intrinsically bad then 
a situation A featuring P must be worse than any barely different situation lacking P. Thus 
one could retain the judgement that killing is worse, in itself, than letting-die, but deny that 
this implies that case 2 should thereby be judged worse than case 1. The problem with this is 
that denial of the bare-difference principles appears to empty the concept of intrinsic 
badness. If a feature's being intrinsically bad does not contribute or add to overall disvalue 
then what interesting consequences flow from the attribution of intrinsic badness? What 
use would the notion of intrinsic badness be. In particular, if killing 1s worse than lettmg-
die, but the bare-difference principle is false, then we cannot conclude that a situation's 
involving a killing makes it any worse than a comparable situation involving a letting-die. 
Thus if a letting-die is sometimes permissible, then nothing in the badness of killing would 
prevent some comparable killings being permissible as well. The denial of the bare-
difference principle would thus render the thesis of the intrinsic badness of killing totally 
ineffective in any argument against active euthanasia. 
Given that killing is not worse, in itself, than letting-die, three other possibilities present 
themselves. One is that letting-die is worse, in itself than killing. However, it would not be 
hard to construct a bare-difference argument against that thesis. Indeed, if you think that 
case 1, in which the physician lets her patient die, is no worse than case 2, in which she kills 
him, then we already have such an argument up and running. A second possibility is that the 
two are simply not comparable for value. They are evaluatively incommensurable. The third 
is that they are comparable and evaluatively equivalent. Thus if killing and letting-die can 
be compared for intrinsic value then they are, in themselves, evaluatively equivalent. In 
what follows I will assume that the two are evaluatively commensurable, and hence in 
themselves, evaluatively equivalent. 
III EUTHANASIA UNDER NEW ZEALAND LAW 
Some legal codes replicate, to a greater or lesser extent, the supposed asymmetry between 
killing and letting-die, or more generally between doings and allowings, embedded in our 
everyday moral discourse. The Crimes Act 1961 is, however, remarkably neutral between 
doings and al!owings (or between acts and omissions). Indeed, it goes somewhat further 
than this even handedness by effectively denying the very distinction between killing and 
letting-die.4 In s 158 homicide is defined as "[T}he killing of a human being by another, 
Note that it is no part of my argument that there is no difference between killing and letting-die, 
or between doing and allowing. Rather, it is that in itself this perfectly good distinction between 
killing and letting-die carries no moral relevance. Criticisms of the bare-difference argument often 
conflate these two quite different points. 
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directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever". Killing a human may be either culpable or 
not as specified ins 160: 
( 1) Homicide may be either culpable or not culpable. 
(2) Homicide is culpable when it consists in the killing of any person: 
(a) By an unlawful act; or 
(b) By an omission without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal duty; or 
(c) By both combined; or 
(d) By causing that person by threats or fear of violence, or by deception, to do an 
act which causes his death; or 
(e) By wilfully frightening a child under the age of 16 years or a sick person. 
(3) Except as provided in section 178 of this Act, culpable homicide is either murder or 
manslaughter. 
(4) Homicide that is not culpable is not an offence. 
Already here we have a hint that the Act does not recognise the distinction between 
killing and allowing to die. Subsection (2)(b) entails that some omissions (or allowings) if 
they lead to death, are cases of killings. However, this is conditional upon the omission 
being the failure to perform a legal duty. Section 151 adds specific details of when such legal 
duties obtain: 
(1) Every one who has charge of any other person unable, by reason of detention, age, 
sickness, insanity, or any other cause, to withdraw himself from such charge, and 
unable to provide himself with the necessaries of life, is (whether such charge is 
undertaken by him under any contract or is imposed upon him by law or by reason of 
his unlawful act or otherwise howsoever) under a legal duty to supply that person 
with the necessaries of life, and is criminally responsible for omitting without lawful 
excuse to perform such duty if the death of that person is caused, or if his life is 
endangered or his health permanently injured, by such omission. 
(2) Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years who, without 
lawful excuse, neglects the duty specified in this section so that the life of the person 
under his charge is endangered or his health permanently injured by such neglect. 
These three sections taken together render a whole swag of everyday cases of passive 
euthanasia not only illegal, but cases of culpable homicide, indeed of murder. Suppose an 
elderly patient who is incapacitated and bedridden by a severe stroke develops pneumonia. 
The pneumonia could be treated quite simply by a cheap course of antibiotics. (Note that 
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such a treatment hardly counts as an "heroic and extraordinary" attempt to prolong life!) 
But often the practitioner will discretely inquire of the relatives whether they want the 
treatment pursued or withheld. To withhold it, however, would make the physician and the 
relatives liable to prosecution under s 151. Take s 151 together with ss 158 and 160, and 
they are liable to a charge of culpable homicide. If it can be shown that their intention, in 
with holding the antibiotics, was to significantly raise the probability of the death of the 
elderly patient, then under s 1675 they are presumably liable to a charge of murder rather 
than of manslaughter. 
Section 157 widens the scope of the applicability of this even handed treatment beyond 
those with professional legal duties: 
Every one who undertakes to do any act the omission to do which is or may be dangerous to 
life is under a legal duty to do that act, and is criminally responsible for the consequences of 
omitting without lawful excuse to discharge that duty. 
Finally, in ss 164 and 165 this even handed treatment of acts and omissions is extended 
beyond those who have specific legal duties to the populace as a whole. 
Every one who by any act or omission causes the death of another person kills that person, 
although the effect of the bodily injury caused to that person was merely to hasten his death 
while labouring under some disorder or disease arising from some other cause. 
Everyone who by any act or omission causes the death of another person kills that person, 
although death from that cause might have been prevented by resorting to proper means. 
Thus any omission which accelerates a death counts as a case killing. Whether or not the 
killing is culpable depends, of course, on the fulfilment of s 160. It follows that in legal terms 
killing is much more widespread both in the medical profession and outside of it than we 
formerly thought. Every time you fail to give as much as you could to famine relief you are 
not letting people die, you are killing them. 
Section 167 Provides: 
Culpable homicide is murder in each of the following cases: 
(a) If the offender means to cause the death of the person killed: 
(b) If the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury that is 
known to the offender to be likely to cause death, and is reckless whether 
death ensues or not: 
(c) If the offender means to cause death, or, being so reckless as aforesaid, 
means to cause such bodily injury as aforesaid to one person, and by accident 
or mistake kills another person, though he does not mean to hurt the person 
killed: 
(d) If the offender for any unlawful object does an act that he knows to be 
likely to cause death, and thereby kills any person, though he may have 
desired that his object should be effected without hurting any one. 
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The Crimes Act here has distorted the normal concept of killing out of all recognition. 
This is confused as a piece of conceptual analysis of the concepts involved. Nevertheless 
underlying the confusion is the genuine insight that the distinction between killing and 
letting-die should carry the kind of normative freight in the law which, according to 
commonsense, it is supposed to carry in morality. In other words, those who drew up the Act 
clearly thought that the Law should not treat acts and omissions totally differently. But 
there are two ways of ensuring parity of legal treatment. One is to regard every case of 
intentionally letting-die as comparable to an otherwise similar case of intentional killing, 
about which the Law takes a very dim view. The other is to revise the law on intentional 
killings to make it accord with our intuitive moral judgments about comparable cases of 
intentional allowings to die.6 
IV TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
REVISITED 
In the light of the moral equivalence of active and passive euthanasia it will be 
instructive to review some of the leading arguments put forward against the moral and legal 
permissibility of active euthanasia. In each case, the kind of argumentation which is 
typically employed against active euthanasia produces either absurd or demonstrably false 
consequences when applied to passive euthanasia. 
It is interesting to note that when the Federal Government in Australia passed the Euthanasia 
Laws Act 1997, it amended the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 to include s SOA 
which reads: 
(1) Subject to this section the power of the Legislative Assembly conferred by section 6 in 
relation to the making of laws does not extend to the making of laws which permit or have 
the effect of permitting (whether subject to conditions or not) the form of intentional killing 
of another called euthanasia (which includes mercy killing) or the assisting a person to 
terminate his or her life. 
(2) The Legislative Assembly does have power to make laws with respect to: 
(a) the withdrawal or withholding of medical or surgical measures for prolonging the life of 
a patient but not so as to permit the intentional killing of the patient; and 
(b) medical treatment in the provision of palliative care to a dying patient, but not so as to 
permit the intentional killing of the patient; and 
(c) the appointment of an agent by a patient who is authorised to make decisions about the 
withdrawal or withholding of treatment; and 
(d) the repealing of legal sanctions against attempted suicide. 
This passage is clearly at odds with New Zealand law in its account of what killing amounts to, 
and tends to reinforce the asymmetry between active and passive euthanasia. (I am indebted to 
Duncan Webb for drawing these provisions to my attention.) 
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If I am right about this, the Crimes Act has achieved parity in exactly the wrong way, 
and is thus badly in need of radical reform. This analysis is supported by those cases in 
which the courts have considered the ability of medical staff to bring on death by omission, 
and the judgment has been more in accord with the common-sense approval of passive 
euthanasia. For example, Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney Generaf seemed to 
conclude that non intervention was justified where treatment could not "prevent cure or 
alleviate a disease which threatened life or health". It is also of note that where a doctor 
has assisted the death of a patient the courts have shown lenience in sentencing -
occasionally not imprisoning the offender: R v Ruscoe." In R v Cox" a doctor who 
(unsuccessfully) injected a terminally ill patient to cause death was given a 12 month 
suspended sentence. This suggests that the courts are already realigning judgments on active 
euthanasia with judgments on comparable cases of passive euthanasia.10 
A The sanctity of life 
Opponents of euthanasia often appeal to the "sanctity of life" principle and claim that 
euthanasia would violate it. The idea is that human beings are special, even unique, in that 
their simply being alive is of enormous value. Perhaps being alive is of infinite value, or at 
least overriding value compared with the kinds of goods and evils that fill a life. This would 
explain why proponents of the sanctity of life principle often dismiss the evil of suffering as 
inconsequential or trivial compared with the value of life as such. Given a suitable version 
of the principle, it follows that it cannot be right to take a life, even your own, just to bring 
avoidable suffering to an end. 
Suppose the principle of the sanctity of life were strong enough to make it wrong to kill 
someone to relieve their suffering. Suppose that killing and letting-die are evaluatively 
commensurable. Then since killing is evaluatively equivalent to letting-die, it would be 
equally wrong to let someone die in order to relieve suffering, when their death could be 
prevented. If the sanctity of life principle entails that the value of being alive always 
outweighs the disvalue of any possible suffering, then given equivalence it cannot be 
permissible to allow preventable deaths to avoid suffering. The fact that we do think it 
morally permissible to allow people to die when their lives are full of pointless suffering 
shows that we really do not hold the sanctity principle at all. Rather, we think that the 
value of being alive can sometimes be outweighed by the disvalue of the suffering that fills 
such a life. 
10 
[1993]1 NZLR 235. 
(1992) 8 CRNZ 68. 
(1992) 12 BMLR I. 
Again, I am indebted to Duncan Webb for drawing these cases to my attention. 
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B Playing God 
A different sort of argument appeals to the idea that God alone is entitled to decide when 
a person should live and when she should die. We shouldn't "play God". The idea is, of 
course, totally unacceptable as a basis for law-making in a largely secular state. Many, 
maybe most, people in New Zealand don't even believe God exists, let alone claim intimate 
knowledge of what God thinks about matters such as these. But that is not the objection I 
wish to raise against it. Suppose it really does entail that we should never carry out active 
euthanasia. Then, by evaluative equivalence, it also entails that we should always allow 
people to die when intervention would prevent their deaths. If someone will die without 
intervention, then to prevent his death is to pre-empt God. (That would be very bad news for 
the medical profession, which is in the daily business of making life and death decisions.) 
C Professional ethos 
A more promising principle claims that the role of the medical profession is to save life, 
not to destroy it. Those who work in the medical profession are properly imbued by their 
training and their practice with a strong pro-attitude to promoting life wherever possible. 
To ask doctors and nurses and other medical professionals to start actively disposing of 
lives through active euthanasia would be to ask them to adopt incompatible attitudes to the 
sick and dying. 
If this is right, then it is not clear how we can justify the expectation that the medical 
profession should practice passive euthanasia. Given equivalence, it is just as bad to allow 
someone to die who might be saved as it is to kill someone who might otherwise live. It seems 
that by asking the medics to be prepared to allow salvageable lives to perish is already to 
foist incompatible attitudes on them. 
Once we have undermined the moral significance of the doing/ allowing distinction, the 
practice of passive euthanasia is testimony to a quite different underlying medical ethos. The 
medical profession does not exist primarily to prolong lives. It exists, as do many other 
professions, to make our lives better than they would otherwise be. Prolonging a life is 
typically a good means to the end of making that life as good as it can be. 
Suffering and illness are always bad in themselves. That is to say, other things being 
equal, it seems that less suffering and illness is always better than more. So if other things 
are equal, then it is always justifiable to attempt to remove illness and suffering. So those 
who have equipped themselves to control suffering and illness should try to eliminate them 
where they can. Of course, things are not always equal. We live in a world in which the 
cure can sometimes be worse than the disease. Sometimes the attempt to eliminate a 
particular illness might produce even more suffering and harm. In such cases a wise medic 
will not pursue the treatment. This does nothing to impugn that medic's commitment to the 
underlying ethos of his profession. 
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Is death, like suffering and illness, bad in itself? This is harder to evaluate by the method 
of bare-difference. The problem is that two situations which differ in that in one the person 
dies and in the other he continues to live probably differ in a myriad of other ways. Exactly 
how they differ depends crucially on how we conceive of death. Is death the total 
annihilation of a person, or is it the doorway into a new life in some other realm? If death is 
the latter, and we hold all other things fixed (degree of suffering, for example) then of course 
there will not be much to choose between the two. But this argument also shows that we are 
not really interested here in whether death is bad in itself and here I will not try to 
determine that. What is clear is that given various assumptions about the nature of death 
(that it is not, for example, the doorway to an eternity of suffering in hell), there will be 
actual cases in which we all judge death to be, all things considered, a "blessing". That is, 
death can be an instrumental good in certain circumstances, regardless of its intrinsic value 
or disvalue. There can be cases in which death would improve the overall value of a 
person's life, taken as a whole, and continued life would diminish its value. That we have 
this view is borne out by the widespread practice of passive euthanasia. Sometimes the 
attempt to prolong a life can make that life, as a whole, less worth living. And in refraining 
from prolonging a life, a medic bears witness to the fact that preserving life is not her 
overriding goal at all. Rather, the real goal is that of enabling the doctor's patients to lead 
lives which, by their own lights, are as good as they can be given the less than perfect world 
which we dwell in. 
Once we recognise that the underlying purpose of the medical profession is not 
preserving life at all costs, but making lives as good as they can be in an imperfect world, the 
standard professional ethos argument against active euthanasia also collapses.11 
D The possibility of hope 
Opponents of euthanasia often point out that, whereas death is final, while a person is 
still alive there is "always room for hope", and it is too risky to presume that their lives are 
not going to improve radically. 
The claim that there is always room for hope is usually exaggerated. But more 
importantly, even when it might just be possible that life will improve, it might not be worth 
the costs of pursuing such an improvement. (It is just possible that this week you will buy the 
winning Lotto ticket, but that does not make it rational to exchange your house for Lotto 
tickets.) Now consider passive euthanasia again. For some terminal conditions there are 
treatments which would slightly improve one's chances of survival. Suppose such a 
11 In any case, nothing in the original argument would prevent us from setting up a quite different 
profession of "euthanasists", whose professional duties would include making sure people were 
not forced to live longer than they themselves judged valuable. (I owe this point to Fred 
Robinson, an active campaigner for euthanasia.) 
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treatment were very painful and, if unsuccessful, would remove whatever enjoyment you 
might have left. It is neither immoral nor stupid to refuse such treatment. I doubt whether any 
sane person would argue for legislation forcing people to undergo such treatments. With 
passive euthanasia we allow people to forego a small chance of survival in order to avoid 
the near certainty of future pam and suffering. The mere possibility of a miraculous 
recovery is thus not in itself a good reason to cling to life. By equivalence, it is also not a 
good reason to reject active euthanasia if such is the only means available to ending what 
would otherwise be a painful and pointlessly slow demise. 
E The Slippery Slope 
Opponents of legalising active euthanasia sometimes concede that it might be 
occasionally justified, but argue that legalisation is the top of a slippery slope, at the bottom 
of which is a Brave New World. Voluntary active euthanasia blends, by borderline cases, 
into involuntary active euthanasia of those whose lives others deem not worth living - the 
old, the disabled, the weak and defenceless. This argument usually goes with another - that 
of guilt by association. (We all know what happened in Nazi Germany!) The very word 
"euthanasia" conjures up images of concentration camps and torturous lethal experiments 
on helpless, non-consenting minorities. Consider the following argument from George and 
Porth: 12 
What sort of society would creation of a right to assisted suicide help us to become ..... [I]t 
would be likely to lead to moral deterioration and a slide from acceptance of suicide as a 
'rational' and legitimate choice to acceptance of 'mercy killing' with or without the victim's 
consent and even to the disposal of those who desire to cling to life but whose desire is 
deemed selfish or irrational. ... [T]he slope becomes very slippery very fast as soon as a society 
begins acting on the proposition that some people are better off dead .... [O)nly sentimentality 
stands in the way of embracing the concept of "lebensunswertes Leben" - "life unworthy of 
life". 
This kind of slippery-slope argument is perhaps the hardest to evaluate. It has to be 
admitted that it is possible that even if active euthanasia is no worse than passive 
euthanasia, nevertheless the legalisation and open practice of active euthanasia might have 
bad effects on our attitudes to the dying and the elderly, attitudes which are not induced by 
the current practice of passive euthanasia. The legalisation of active euthanasia might make 
us lose our grip on the value of life, to see sick, elderly or disabled people as nuisances 
which we would be well rid of. Family members might bring pressure to bear on their elderly 
or sick, because of the debilitating financial and emotional costs of caring for them. 
Physicians might end up regarding the taking of life as a small matter, something which 
12 R George and W Porth "Death, be not Proud" National Review June 26, 1995,49-52, 52. 
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doesn't necessarily require the informed consent of the patient, for example. It might be much 
easier to take peoples lives without obtaining the consent of any of the relevant parties. 
I want to make two points about this kind of argument. Firstly, we should not lose sight 
of the simple point that there is an important distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia, and that this distinction cuts across the active-passive distinction. The 
voluntary-involuntary distinction is all too obviously a morally significant one, and one 
that in recent years has been slowly but surely gaining ground across the medical domain. It 
is the main distinction which needs to be clarified and regulated in any proposed legislation 
concerning end-of-life decisions. Currently it is not at all clear that when euthanasia, 
passive or active, is carried out it is carried out with desire or the informed consent of those 
killed or allowed to die. Where the distinction is not clear, and clearly enforced, there is 
indeed a very dangerous slippery slope from voluntary passive euthanasia to involuntary 
passive euthanasia. And where active euthanasia is illegal that in itself suppresses open 
discussion of the issue. Hence active euthanasia is much more likely to be involuntary than 
voluntary wherever it is illegal and punishable. Any change in the law concerning 
euthanasia should thus strengthen the general requirement of informed consent not only for 
treatments but also for withholdings and withdrawings of treatments. 
We could certainly make the conditions for ascertaining voluntariness and informed 
consent so stringent that if we err at all we will err by depriving people who really want to 
die of their desired end. (This may well be the effect of the constraints in the now repealed 
Northern Territories legislation.) But compare this again with passive euthanasia. Nobody 
argues in the following way: 
Its being legally permissible to refuse a life-saving treatment puts pressure on people generally 
to refuse life-saving treatments, even people who really want the treatment. If the life-saving 
treatment is costly then people who might be saved by it may feel pressure to refuse it from 
those who foot the bill. This is eroding our sense of the value of life, and we will surely end up 
with massive under treatment of people whose lives could be saved. Because of this 
dangerous slippery slope down which we are currently sliding, whenever some treatment 
might prolong a life, it must be carried out regardless of the well being or expressed wishes of 
the patient. 
Nobody argues like this not only because the conclusion is accepted as morally 
repugnant, but because it also flies in the face of the facts. People have a moral right to refuse 
treatments. They are also not obliged to spend large sums of money on costly treatment even 
if the likely alternative is death. But we do not see the erosion of respect for life which this 
argument suggests is inevitable. Rather, what we see is a growth in awareness amongst 
reflective people of the necessity to regulate the striving to prolong life at any cost. Not only 
is it wasteful of resources which could be spent on improving quality rather than mere 
quantity of life, but it is actually promoting much unnecessary, pointless suffering. 
221 
222 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
This brings rre to the second point about these kinds of slippery slope argument. The 
reason they are sometimes found hard to evaluate has not always been recognised by 
philosophers. Philosophers like their arguments to be totally a priori, like the bare-
difference argument which I developed at the start. We do not have to investigate the world 
in order to lay out such arguments. All we need is a comfortable armchair and a little time to 
perform some inexpensive thought experiments. The problem with many slippery slope 
arguments is that they are not amenable to such a priori reasoning. This particular slippery 
slope argument is like that. It concerns the probable impact of legalisation of euthanasia on 
attitudes and practices. It thus involves contingent matters of fact about ourselves which 
can only be decided by a messy empirical investigation. Philosophers are not particularly 
good at those. 
In order to decide whether legalisation would have the kinds of effects predicted we 
really need to do a rather large-scale social experiment. Take two otherwise fairly similar 
societies, A and N, but make them differ in one important respect. In A let there be explicit 
laws against active euthanasia, while in N make it possible for doctors to practice 
euthanasia (both active and passive) openly without fear of legal sanction provided certain 
guidelines, including provisions for informed consent, are respected. Compare attitudes and 
practices concerning end-of-life decisions in N over a period of time. Further, compare 
attitudes and practices in N at the end of the experimental period with those in A at the end 
of the period. The two comparisons should give us fairly reliable information about the 
effect of legalisation of euthanasia on attitudes and practices concerned with end-of-life 
decision. If it turns out that attitudes to end-of-life decisions deteriorate inN, and that at the 
end of the period they compare unfavourably with those in A, then we can reasonably 
attribute the differences to the legislation itself. 
The problem with this research proposal is, of course, that it would be morally 
questionable to carry out a large-scale experiment of this sort when what is at issue is the 
very moral permissibility of the proposed change in the law! Fortunately, however, we don't 
have to carry out the experiment in order to gather the requisite data. Two such societies 
already exist- A is Australia and N is the Netherlands. Two surveys were carried out in 
the Netherlands, one in 1990 and one in 1995, which monitored the change over time of 
attitudes and practices concerned with end-of-life decisions. The same survey was carried 
out in Australia in 1995-6.13 The following is a brief summary of some of the relevant 
results: 
13 
1. In the Netherlands, between 1990 and 1995 there was a small increase in cases of 
active voluntary euthanasia-from 1.7% of all deaths to 2.4% (±0.3%). In Australia in 
H Kuhse,. P Singer, P Baume, M Clark, and M Rickard, "End-of-Life Decisions in Australian 
Medical Practice Medical Journal of Australia (17 February, 1997) 166, 191-196. 
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1996 the percentage of deaths by active v~luntary euthanasia was similar to that m 
the Netherlands in 1990 (1.8%). 
2. · In the Netherlands the percentage of active terminations of life without the patiei1t's 
explicit request or consent fell slightly from 0.8% to 0.7%. In Australia in 1995/6 the 
percentage of such deaths was 3.5%-five times higher than in the Netherlands! 
3. In the Netherlands in 1995 13.5% of all deaths were preceded by a decision to 
withhold or withdraw treatment with the intention of hastening death or not 
prolonging life. In Australia the figure for 1995/6 was 30.5% Furthermore, in Australia 
in 22.5% of cases the treatment was withheld or withdrawn without the patient's 
explicit consent. 
The implications are clear enough. In Australia the practice of bringing lives to an end 
without explicit request or informed consent is significantly more widespread than it is in 
the Netherlands, where rates are not only lower but also stable over time.14 
V AN ARGUMENT FOR LEGALISING EUTHANASIA: THE SLIPPERY 
SLOPE TILTS BACKWARDS 
Showing that the standard arguments against the legalisation of active euthanasia fail is 
not tantamount to a positive argument for legalisation. However, the results of the 
Australian study are not only a severe blow to one of the most popular standard slippery 
slope arguments against the legalisation of euthanasia. They actually support a powerful 
argument for the legalisation of euthanasia. 
If the rates for involuntary terminations were the same in both countries then that would 
be sufficient in itself to undermine the soundness of the slippery slope argument. But the 
higher rates in Australia cry out for an explanation. As the authors of the Australian study 
point out, one plausible explanation of the higher rates is the very illegality of euthanasia. 
The practice is illegal and can invite severe sanctions under the law. Nevertheless many 
practitioners, given their experience of dealing with the dying and chronically ill, have come 
to the conclusion that the law is quite wrong in this respect. Their belief is strong enough to 
motivate them to flout the law, provided of course that they can do so without risking severe. 
penalties. So naturally the decisions which they take this will typically be rather secretive. 
They will not want to discuss these decisions openly with patients or relatives, for fear that 
their standard practices will be exposed to legal scrutiny. So this will generate a lack of 
openness. It follows that doctors will have to take decisions into their own hands without 
14 A similar study is planned in the United States, to be carried out by the Center for Values and 
Social Policy, Philosophy Department, University of Colorado at Boulder. 
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any consultation with the relevant parties. The upshot is that a considerable number of 
people are having their lives terminated sooner than they would have liked. 
The standard slippery slope argument is revealed by the facts to be bereft of value. But 
more than this, it seems the facts are best explained by a sharp slope in the opposite 
direction. It is the illegality of euthanasia which erodes healthy attitudes to the sick and 
dying and leads to widespread abuse of the chronically and terminally ill. It is the illegality 
which has generated an elite who control when we live and die without any consultation 
with those most affected. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In the case of each of the traditional arguments against active euthanasia, an extension 
of the argument to passive euthanasia yields morally unacceptable or else demonstrably 
false conclusions. In each case there must be something wrong with the original argument 
against active euthanasia. Almost everybody who thinks about it seriously and sensitively 
comes to the conclusion that passive euthanasia can be morally justified - when the burden 
of life is very considerable, when the dying person rationally prefers to die, when the dying 
person consents to the process, the death is dignified and painless, and so on. Further, even if 
this is strictly illegal under the Crimes Act, the courts are now making judgments which gel 
with commonsense on passive euthanasia. The debate is thus not over the moral 
permissibility of euthanasia as such, but over whether the same considerations that clearly 
apply to passive euthanasia should also apply to active euthanasia. The only principled 
way to block such an extension is to maintain that killing, in itself, is much worse than 
letting-die. But, as we have seen, that claim is simply unsustainable. Finally, the current law 
is not only forcing many people to live lives that they do not want to live, it is almost 
certainly costing the lives of those who do want to go on living. It is time for reform.15 
15 I owe a big debt to Duncan Webb, for numerous insightful comments and criticisms the first draft 
of this paper. Unfortunately, I still have to assume responsibility for all the defects of the final 
version. 
